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This paper describes a new industry-adjusted index of state environmen-
tal compliance costs that can be used to compare regulations both across
states in a given year and within states over time.1 It compares that index
to others used in the environmental economics literature and uses the in-
dex to answer several often-raised questions about the pattern of environ-
mental regulations in the United States and how that pattern has changed
over time. Finally, the paper describes an application of the index, as used
to assess the eﬀect of environmental regulatory stringency on foreign direct
investment to U.S. states.
There are three key motivations for creating this index. First, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) has worried publicly that some states
are laggards in enforcing federal standards.2 The index described here doc-
uments the variation across states in their environmental compliance costs.
Second, since 1980 responsibility for monitoring and enforcement of envi-
ronmental regulations has been devolving from the federal government to
state and local regulators. In theory, this could cause states to become less
or more similar in their standard stringency as they are freed to set their
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1. Interested readers can ﬁnd a Stata ﬁle containing the index at http://www.georgetown.
edu/faculty/am16/index2.htm.
2. See, e.g., the articles by J. H. Cushman, Jr., “States Neglecting Pollution Rules, White
House Says,” New York Times, 15 December 1996, p. 1.1; and “E.P.A. and States Found to
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own levels of stringency and to compete with their neighbors to attract
industry or clean their environments. This index provides data on the de-
gree of convergence in state standard stringency over time. Third, analysts
studying the eﬀects of environmental regulations on local and national
economies have been hampered by the diﬃculty of accurately measuring
andcomparingthestringencyofthoseregulations(Jaﬀeetal.1995).Inpar-
ticular, studies of the eﬀect of regulations on local economies rely almost
exclusively on cross-sectional data,3 subjective indexes of state standards
or cost-based measures that do not control for industrial composition.
Existing measures of environmental regulatory stringency take two
forms. First, there are the environmental groups’ rankings of states. These
are subjective and typically only measure perceptions of states’ eﬀorts at
one time, so intertemporal comparisons are not possible. Most analysts
have therefore relied on the Census Bureau’s Pollution Abatement Costs
and Expenditures (PACE) survey data to construct measures of statewide
compliance costs per unit of output. These measures, however, fail to con-
trol for states’ industrial compositions. Consequently, states with a lot of
polluting industry have relatively high environmental compliance costs,
regardless of their regulations.
To address these concerns, section 4.2 describes the new industry-ad-
justed index and reports ﬁndings about relative stringency and how it has
changed over time. Section 4.3 describes existing subjective measures of
environmental standard stringency and compares them to the industry-ad-
justed index. Section 4.4 describes an application of the index to assess the
eﬀect of environmental stringency on foreign direct investment to U.S.
states.
4.2 An Industry-Adjusted Index of State Environmental
Compliance Costs
Many researchers have relied on the Census Bureau’s PACE survey to
construct indexes of state environmental regulatory stringency. The PACE
survey collected data from manufacturing establishments about their pol-
lution abatement operating and capital costs from 1977 to 1994, when it
was discontinued.4 Most commonly, studies use these costs divided by
some measure of state economic activity, such as total employment or
3. Because most studies examine diﬀerences among jurisdictions at one time, they cannot
distinguish between the simultaneous eﬀects of regulations on economic growth and that of
economic growth on regulations. Notable exceptions include Gray (1997), Greenstone
(1998), and Becker and Henderson (1997).
4. Recently, it appears that the EPA and the Census Bureau have agreed on plans to again
collect the PACE data. Unfortunately, there will have been a minimum of 5 years during
which the data were not collected. The PACE data collected from 1973 to 1976 are incompat-
ible with later surveys in their treatment of small plants. Also, the PACE data were not
collected in 1987.gross state product (GSP).5 The most signiﬁcant problem with such mea-
sures is that they fail to adjust for industrial composition. States that have
pollution-intensive industrial compositions will incur high pollution abate-
ment costs, whether or not they have stringent regulations. Ideally, one
would use the pollution abatement costs in the relevant industry as an
index of regulatory stringency. While abatement costs by state and indus-
try are published annually by the Census Bureau, so many of the observa-
tions are censored to prevent disclosure of conﬁdential information that
the data are not comparable year-to-year or state-to-state.6 Therefore, this
paper proposes an alternative index.
The index compares the actual pollution abatement costs in each state,
unadjusted for industrial composition, to the predicted abatement costs in
each state, where the predictions are based solely on nationwide abatement
expenditures by industry and each state’s industrial composition.7 Let the








where Pst is pollution abatement costs in state s in year t,a n dYst is the
manufacturing sector’s contribution to the GSP of state s in year t. Sst is
the type of unadjusted measure of compliance costs commonly used. By
failing to adjust for the industrial composition of each state, it probably
overstates the compliance costs of states with more pollution-intensive in-
dustries and understates the costs in states with relatively clean industries.
To adjust for industrial composition, compare equation (1) to the pre-
dicted pollution abatement costs per dollar of GSP in state s:













5. See, e.g., Crandall (1993), Friedman, Gerlowski, and Silberman (1992), or List and Co
(2000). Consulting ﬁrms specializing in industrial siting decisions have also relied on such
simple indexes of environmental regulatory stringency (Alexander Grant & Co. 1985).
6. Several papers have used the conﬁdential plant-level PACE data to construct such in-
dexes (Levinson 1996; Gray 1997). However, those data are unavailable to most researchers,
and the purpose here is to construct an easily accessible resource for analysts. Later, I do
compare the index created from the conﬁdential data to that compiled from the published
data.
7. For two reasons, I use pollution abatement operating expenses (as opposed to capital
expenses) in the index. First, operating expenses for pollution abatement equipment are eas-
ier for PACE survey respondents to identify separately. Abatement capital expenses may be
diﬃcult to disentangle from investments in production process changes that have little to do
with pollution abatement. Second, abatement capital expenditures are highest when new
investment takes place. So states that have thriving economies and are generating manufac-
turing investment tend to have high levels of abatement capital expenses, regardless of the
stringency of those states’ environmental laws. Operating costs are more consistent from year
to year.
Industry-Adjusted Index of State Environmental Compliance Costs 133where industries are indexed from 20 through 39 following the two-digit
manufacturing Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) codes,8 Yist is the
contribution of industry i to the GSP of state s at time t, Yit is the nation-
wide contribution of industry i to the national GDP, and Pit is the nation-
wide pollution abatement operating costs of industry i. In other words, Sst
is the weighted average pollution abatement costs (per dollar of GSP),
where the weights are the relative shares of each industry in state s at
time t.
To construct the industry-adjusted index of relative state stringency,
S* st, I compute the ratio of actual expenditures in equation (1) to the pre-







* ˆ . =
When S* st is greater than 1, industries in state s at time t spent more on
pollution abatement than those same industries in other states. When S* st
is less than 1, industries in state s at time t spent less on pollution abate-
ment. By implication, states with large values of S* st have relatively more
stringent regulations than states with small values of S* st.10
Table 4.1 presents the average values of various environmental indexes.
The ﬁrst column contains the average unadjusted index, Sst, from 1977 to
1994 (omitting 1987, when the PACE data were not collected). The second
column contains the industry-adjusted index, S* st.11 Table 4.2 contains the
rankings of these indexes. Several striking facts can be seen from compar-
ing the indexes. First, the ranking of state regulatory stringency according
to the industry-adjusted index (S*) is often quite diﬀerent from the rank-
ing according to the unadjusted index (S). For example, New Jersey manu-
facturers spent a relatively large amount on pollution abatement, causing
the state to be ranked 20th in terms of the average unadjusted index in col-
umn(1)oftable4.2.However,whenNewJersey’srelativelypollution-inten-
sive industrial composition is accounted for, the state’s ranking falls to
34th. In contrast, when Oregon’s relatively clean industrial composition is
8. SIC code 23 (apparel) is omitted because it is relatively pollution-free, and as a result
no data for that industry are collected by the PACE survey.
9. Note that the state’s GSP is in both the numerator and the denominator of equation (3).
Equation (3) can thus be expressed as S* st  Pst/Pst, where Pst is the summation term in
equation (2).
10. I have also calculated the index described by equations (1), (2), and (3) using the num-
ber of production workers in each two-digit SIC code to control for industrial composition,
instead of using each industry’s share of GSP. The broad conclusions are similar, although
the rankings of some states do change. Also, annual employment totals by state and industry
are more often censored to prevent disclosure of conﬁdential information.
11. Appendix table 4A.1 presents annual values of the industry-adjusted index (S*) and



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)accounted for, that state’s ranking improves from 24th to 12th. Similar
reordering takes place for other states, supporting the conclusion that us-
ing abatement costs without adjusting for industrial composition yields a
misleading picture of states’ relative regulatory compliance costs.
A second fact that emerges from the industry-adjusted index is that
while most state rankings are relatively stable, a few change signiﬁcantly
over time. Appendix tables 4A.1 and 4A.2 present the annual ﬁgures.
From 1977 to 1991, Florida dropped from the 4th most costly state to the
25th most costly. By contrast, during the same time period Illinois rose
from the 32nd most costly state to the 23rd.
Third, each of these statements should be tempered by the observation
that there is considerable noise in the data, both in the adjusted and unad-
justed indexes especially for the smaller states. For example, it is hard to
imagine that Rhode Island leapt from the 42nd most costly state in 1986
to 4th in 1988. Most likely, some of the year-to-year variation in the in-
dexes results from sampling error in the PACE survey or from the small
size of some states.
Despite the noisiness of the data for small states, some consistent pat-
terns emerge. To study trends in the data, I regressed S* on year dummies
and a time trend and plotted the residuals. As an example, ﬁgure 4.1 plots
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Fig. 4.1 S* for four statesS* for four large states. Compliance costs in Arizona and Florida declined
between 1977 and 1994, relative to the changing compliance costs in other
states. Note that because S* is already normalized on an annual basis, the
downward trend in S* does not mean that Arizona and Florida have be-
come less expensive in absolute terms, only less expensive relative to other
states. By contrast, over the same period relative compliance costs rose in
Illinois and Massachusetts.
Another important fact discernible from this index is that the variation
among states in their regulatory stringency is decreasing. It has often been
speculated that pressure from federal regulators and national attention is
forcing a convergence in state regulatory stringency. This index provides
the ﬁrst simple evidence of that convergence. Figure 4.2 depicts the co-
eﬃcient of variation in both time series from 1977 to 1994. The coeﬃcient
of variation of the industry-adjusted index drops from 0.44 in 1977 to 0.29
in 1994. Meanwhile variation in the unadjusted index falls much less, from
0.66 to 0.59. Taken together, these two time series suggest that while states’
industrial compositions have become more dissimilar over time, their regu-
latory stringency has become more similar.
Appendix table 4A.2 makes clear that despite the convergence of states’
stringency, there remains substantial variation among states, even as late
as 1994. Expenditures on pollution abatement in 1994 ranged from 0.5
percent of GSP in Nevada, to 6 percent in Louisiana. While much of this
diﬀerence is accounted for by diﬀerences in the two states’ industrial com-
positions, the industry-adjusted index for the most expensive state (Maine)
remains 1.7 times the national average, and 4.13 times as large as for the
least expensive state (Nevada).
Before comparing this index to others, it is important to note a few cave-
140 Arik Levinson
Fig. 4.2 Coeﬃcients of variation: unadjusted and industry-adjusted indexesats. First, this index is not necessarily a measure of regulatory stringency
alone. Other state characteristics may well drive up the cost of pollution
abatement. For example, if the wages of environmental engineers vary
state-to-state, they will aﬀect the relative pollution abatement costs. Fur-
thermore, this index is not intended to be a measure of environmental
quality. Many of the nation’s most polluted regions also have the strictest
regulations.
Second, this industry-adjusted index makes no attempt to control for
the relative age of diﬀerent states’ manufacturers. This is important be-
cause many state environmental standards are more strict for new sources
of pollution than for existing sources. Consequently, states that have rela-
tively new manufacturing bases also have relatively high compliance costs,
even after controlling for their industrial compositions. Conversely, states
that have relatively old manufacturers will experience lower compliance
costs. There is, therefore, potentially a positive correlation between the
amount of new investment and this industry-adjusted index of regulatory
compliance costs. However, there is also reason to believe that this bias is
small. In another paper (Levinson 1996), I regressed pollution abatement
expenditures at the plant level on plant characteristics, including an indi-
cator for plants built in the last 5 years. The new plant indicator, although
positive, was small and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Third, this industry-adjusted index of environmental stringency, S*,
controls for states’ industrial compositions at the level of two-digit SIC
codes. While this surely accounts for a lot of the diﬀerences among states,
there is equally certain to be heterogeneity among states within two-digit
classiﬁcations. For example, SIC 26, pulp and paper, includes both pulp
mills, which are among the most pollution-intensive manufacturers, and
envelope assemblers, which emit very little pollution. To the extent that
some states contain relatively more pulp mills and others merely assemble
envelopes, if the former experience high abatement costs, that will prob-
ably be due to diﬀering industrial compositions rather than more strin-
gent environmental regulations. In other words, the index S* retains some
of the bias due to industrial compositions—in particular, heterogeneity
of industrial compositions within any given two-digit SIC code.
4.3 Existing Indexes of State Environmental Regulatory Eﬀort
Attempts to quantify state environmental regulations have taken numer-
ous forms over the years. Many environmental organizations have com-
piled indexes for this purpose, and these indexes form a standard against
which the industry-adjusted index can be compared.
Conservation Foundation Index. In 1983 the Conservation Foundation at-
tempted to measure each state’s “eﬀort to provide a quality environment
for its citizens” (Duerkson 1983, 218). They compiled an index from 23
Industry-Adjusted Index of State Environmental Compliance Costs 141components, including environmental and land-use characteristics such as
theLeagueofConservationVoters’assessmentofeachstate’scongressional
delegation’s voting record, the existence of state environmental-impact-
statement processes, and the existence of language speciﬁcally protecting
the environment in state land-use statutes. Conservation Foundation staﬀ
assigned weights to each component based on subjective assessments of
their importance, and the weighted sum is an index ranging from 0 to 63.
Minnesota and California received the best scores, while Missouri and
Alabama received the worst.
FREE Index. The Fund for Renewable Energy and the Environment
(FREE 1987) published an index of the strength of state environmental
programs. The components of the index include state laws regarding air
quality, hazardous waste, and groundwater pollution. Wisconsin and Cali-
fornia scored the highest, while West Virginia and Mississippi received the
lowest marks.
Green Index. Hall and Kerr (1991) compiled the widely cited Green Index
of state and environmental health from 256 measures of public policy and
environmental quality. Oregon and Maine lie at the top of the ranking,
while Louisiana and Alabama are last.
Southern Studies Index. The Institute for Southern Studies (1994) ranked
the states based on 20 environmental measures such as air quality, state
spending on the environment, pollution and waste generation, and energy
eﬃciency, and then added up the 20 rankings of each state to get a com-
posite index. Vermont and New Hampshire had the best scores, while
Texas and Louisiana had the worst.
League of Conservation Voters (LCV). Each year, the LCV assigns each
U.S. senator and representative a score from 1 to 100, based on his or her
voting record on environmental bills chosen by the LCV. Some researchers
have used these scores as a measure of the environmental sentiment in
each state (Gray 1997). To compare these scores to the compliance cost
index, I averaged each state’s House and Senate delegation’s environmental
voting records. Each record is the average voting record for each member
of the state’s delegation. Thus, for states with more House members than
Senate members, the Senate votes are weighted more heavily (and vice
versa).12
Table 4.1 reports the values of each environmental index for each state.
Table 4.2 presents each index’s ranking of states. The rankings of the sub-
12. For further details, see the appendix.
142 Arik Levinsonjective indexes conform loosely to anecdotal evidence and to reports in the
popular press. Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana consistently receive
the lowest grades from environmental organizations, while Massachusetts,
Wisconsin, Minnesota, and California receive the highest grades. I suspect
that few policy analysts, environmental regulators, or industry representa-
tives would be surprised by these rankings, and I therefore refer to these
indexes as the “conventional wisdom” regarding states’ relative environ-
mental eﬀorts.
In column (8) of table 4.1, I present an index calculated from the con-
ﬁdential plant-level Census of Manufactures, as described in Levinson
(1996). Using the raw, establishment-level 1988 PACE data, I regressed the
log of gross pollution abatement operating costs on the log of the book
value of capital, the log of the number of production workers, the log of
value-added, a dummy for new plants, dummies for four-digit SIC codes,
and individual state dummies, all from the 1987 Census of Manufactures.13
The state dummy coeﬃcients are reported in column (8) of table 4.1. A
high-point estimate for a state dummy coeﬃcient indicates that, all else
equal, plants in that state spend more on pollution abatement operating
costs than do otherwise similar plants in the omitted state, New York.
Oddly, this plant-level index is not highly correlated with the more ag-
gregate industry-adjusted index. The correlation between the plant-level
index and the industry-adjusted index in 1988 is only 0.19. There are sev-
eral possible explanations. The plant-level index is from a regression of
1988 PACE data on 1987 Census of Manufactures data for the same ﬁrms.
(The PACE data were not collected in 1987). This mismatch may account
for some of the discrepancy. Also, the plant-level index controls for plant
vintage with a new-plant indicator, to account for the age bias already
discussed, although its coeﬃcient is small and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Table 4.3 presents correlations among the two cost indexes and the ﬁve
conventional indexes. Although they were compiled at diﬀerent times with
widely diﬀerent sets of components, the ﬁve conventional indexes are
highly positively correlated. Except for the LCV index, the conventional
indexes are all fairly ad hoc. Each is based on a list of component mea-
sures, with no objective guide as to what criteria are included or excluded
from the index. Furthermore, each index either adds up the unweighted
ranks of the separate components or weights the separate scores according
to the subjective judgment of the index’s authors. Nevertheless, there is
remarkable consistency across the indexes.
On the other hand, the two cost-based indexes are negatively correlated
13. Implicit in this speciﬁcation is a Cobb-Douglas production function in which output
(Y) is estimated as a function of capital (K), labor (L), and pollution (P), with dummy
variables for new plants, industries, and states: Y  A 
 K 1 
 L2 
 P 3. This estimation
substitutes pollution abatement, which is observable, for pollution, takes the logarithm of
both sides, and inverts the function to estimate abatement as a function of the other variables.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































0with the conventional indexes. While the adjusted and unadjusted indexes
are correlated with each other, they are both negatively correlated with
each of the conventional indexes. While the conventional indexes may
measure something systematic about states, it is not correlated with indus-
trial pollution abatement expenditures.
There are several reasons for the negative correlation between the
compliance-cost-based measures and the environmental organizations’ in-
dexes. The environmental organizations’ indexes often include the quality
of the environment in each state as part of their measure. The Green and
Southern Studies indexes include measures of ambient air and water qual-
ity, and of pollution emitted. In many cases, environmental quality is in-
versely associated with compliance costs because plants in the dirtiest
states are required to spend more eﬀort cleaning up. Los Angeles, for ex-
ample, has both the most polluted air and the toughest emissions stan-
dards in the United States (Berman and Bui 1997).
Another explanation has to do with the fact that the LCV index, which
is itself included in the Conservation Foundation index, ranks states ac-
cording to their congressional delegations’ voting records on national legis-
lation, rather than state legislation. Furthermore, U.S. senators and rep-
resentatives appear to vote for stricter regulations when they are imposed
on other states (Pashigian 1985). Finally, many of the indexes contain
elements unrelated to manufacturers’ pollution abatement costs, such as
curbside recycling programs, spending on public parks, and automobile
inspection programs. While these state characteristics may indicate some-
thing about the overall environmental sentiment in a given state, they are
not necessarily related to the compliance costs faced by manufacturers.
In general, the two groups of indexes measure diﬀerent concepts. The
compliance cost index measures how much it costs to locate a manufactur-
ing facility in any one state, relative to others, in terms of pollution abate-
ment costs. The subjective indexes combine many diﬀerent measures, in-
cluding the quality of the environment, national delegations’ voting
records, and environmental eﬀort unrelated to the manufacturing industry.
4.4 An Application: The Eﬀect of Regulations
on Foreign Direct Investment
As an example of the type of work that this index facilitates, in table 4.4
I present regressions of foreign direct investment (FDI) on characteristics
of U.S. states, including their industry-adjusted indexes of environmental
regulatory stringency, S*.14 Several studies have examined the eﬀects of
environmental regulations on FDI. However, all of the existing studies
have either used a cross section of data, some unadjusted measure of regu-
14. This work is taken from Keller and Levinson (1999), where more details are provided.
Industry-Adjusted Index of State Environmental Compliance Costs 145latory stringency such as S in equation (1), or both (List and Co 2000;
Friedman, Gerlowski, and Silberman 1992). Table 4.4 examines property,
plant, and equipment investment by foreign-owned manufacturers, from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), as a measure of FDI. It presents
regressions of FDI on state characteristics using a time series of data and
the industry-adjusted index of environmental regulatory stringency.
Table 4.4 An Application: Foreign Direct Investment to U.S. States as a Function of
Abatement Costs, 1977–94
Dynamic Panel Data Model:
GMM, First Diﬀerences Pooled OLS
Mean
(SD) Manufacturing Chemicalsa Manufacturing Chemicalsa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Industry-adjusted 500* 267 2.4 338*
index of (237) (186) (92.6) (100)
abatement costs,
S*
Lagged FDI 0.90* 0.89*
(0.02) (0.03)
Market proximity 6,631 0.207* 0.098* 0.104* 0.041*
(8,220) (0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.014)
Population 4,940 0.175* 0.016 0.043 0.003
(thousands) (5,134) (0.033) (0.023) (0.051) (0.054)
Unemployment rate 6.61 122* 86.0* 67.5* 56.6*
(2.09) (43) (29.1) (15.7) (14.0)
Unionization rate 16.6 108* 84.6* 32.7 59.8*
(6.7) (20) (13.9) (21.4) (20.0)
Wages 9.10 179* 32.9 135.7 5.8
(2.24) (87) (66.7) (76.7) (60.1)
Road mileage 80.5 12.3* 10.8* 0.37 4.20
(thousands) (48.4) (2.6) (1.8) (6.25) (5.48)
Land prices 887 0.52* 0.62* 0.21* 0.26*
(per acre) (775) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08)
Energy prices 5.51 288* 144* 54.6* 58.1*
(1.70) (56) (41) (27.7) (24.4)
Tax eﬀort 96.1* 31.0* 11.4* 18.4* 16.6*
(16.1) (5.9) (4.1) (4.9) (4.6)
Year 166* 32.4
(41) (33.4)
Constant 11,602* 1,525 60.4 12.2
(3,072) (2,516) (25.9) (21.5)
Number of 816 811 563 761 496
observations
Number censored 5 109 7 272
R2 0.70 0.47 0.10 0.15
Source: Keller and Levinson (1999). The dependent variable is property, plant, and equipment investment by foreign-
owned manufacturers, from the BEA; see appendix.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 1987 is dropped because no PACE data were collected that year.
aThe chemical industry investment data are only available for 1977–91.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
146 Arik LevinsonThe ﬁrst column of table 4.4 presents means and standard deviations of
the regressors. As a benchmark to compare to the previous literature, col-
umns (2) and (3) contain pooled, ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions
of FDI in the manufacturing sector and the chemical industry, respec-
tively, on the industry-adjusted index of environmental stringency and
other covariates. Controlling for other state characteristics, FDI appears
to be positively correlated with stringency. In column (3), I examine FDI
for the chemical industry (SIC 28). This is one of the only relatively
pollution-intensive, two-digit SIC codes for which this measure of FDI is
reported consistently by the BEA. Here, the coeﬃcient on S* remains pos-
itive, although it is smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant. These results,
however, are based largely on the cross-sectional comparison of states.
(Most of the variation in S* is across states rather than within states over
time.) These cross-sectional results are probably biased if states have unob-
served characteristics correlated with both FDI and regulatory stringency.
To control for those characteristics, and to exploit the panel of data,
consider a dynamic model. Suppose that a reduced-form relationship for
FDI can be characterized by the following equation.15
(4) FDI FDI S X u st s t st st st =+ + ′ + −   , * , 1
where Xst is a vector of characteristics of state s at time t,a n dust is an error
term composed of two parts, ust  sst. Equation (4) states that FDI is
a function of current state characteristics and lagged values of FDI. Both
FDIst and FDIs,t1 are functions of s and therefore OLS estimates of (4)
will be biased because FDIs,t1, a regressor, is correlated with the error
term.
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest a generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimate of equation (4) that uses lagged values of FDIs,t1 as in-
struments and ﬁrst diﬀerences to eliminate the ﬁxed state eﬀects s. First,
take ﬁrst diﬀerences of (4):
(5)     FDI FDI S X st s t st st st =+ + ′ + −   , * , 1
where  symbolizes ﬁrst diﬀerences. Since FDIs,t2 is correlated with
FDIs,t1, but not correlated with FDIst, it is a valid instrument. In fact,
all past values FDIs,t3, FDIs,t4, and so on are valid instruments for
FDIs,t1.
Columns (4) and (5) of table 4.4 present GMM estimates of (5) using
Doornik, Arellano, and Bond (1999).16 When equation (5) is estimated
15. This discussion is based on Baltagi (1995) and Arellano and Bond (1991).
16. Doornik, Arellano, and Bond’s GMM estimation is written for the computer package
Ox, and may be downloaded from http://www.nuﬀ.ox.ac.uk/Users/Doornik/. See Doornik
(1998) and Doornik, Arellano, and Bond (1999).
Industry-Adjusted Index of State Environmental Compliance Costs 147using all manufacturing FDI, in column (4), the large spurious positive
coeﬃcient onS* disappears. Instead, the coeﬃcient (2.4) is tiny and statis-
tically insigniﬁcant, although still positive. Turning to the chemical in-
dustry, in column (5), the coeﬃcient (338) is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant. This suggests that the positive coeﬃcients found in the cross-
sectional evidence in this study and others are spurious, and are based on
unobserved characteristics correlated with both environmental regulations
and economic activity.
To interpret the size of these coeﬃcients, consider the following. The
ﬁxed-eﬀects coeﬃcient in column (5) suggests that a 1-unit increase in the
stringency index is associated with a decline in chemical industry FDI of
$338 million. The standard deviation of this index within states over time
ranges from 0.04 for Wisconsin to 0.56 for Colorado, and averages 0.18.
So the coeﬃcient suggests that a 1 standard deviation increase in the index,
for the average state, is associated with a decline of investment by foreign-
owned chemical manufacturers of $61 million. This amounts to approxi-
mately 6 percent of the annual average chemical industry FDI investment
of $1,017 million per state.
The industry-adjusted index plays two important roles in the regressions
in table 4.4. First, because the index spans 18 years, it is possible to use
changes in the variables from year to year to control for unobserved ﬁxed
state characteristics that may be correlated with both stringency and FDI.
The stringency coeﬃcients in these ﬁrst-diﬀerenced speciﬁcations are neg-
ative, while those in the pooled speciﬁcation are positive, suggesting that
these unobserved state characteristics are extremely important. Second, by
adjusting for industrial composition, the index avoids merely measuring
concentrations of polluting industries and instead assesses average abate-
ment costs, holding industrial composition constant.
While these results are meant only as an example, they do suggest that
an index such as the one described has considerable advantages over em-
pirical approaches taken thus far.
4.5 Conclusion
The research described here creates an industry-adjusted index of state
environmental compliance costs from 1977 to 1994. The index supports
several conclusions. First, industry composition plays an important role in
determining spending on environmental compliance costs for diﬀerent
states. Rank orderings of states by pollution abatement spending look very
diﬀerent once their industrial compositions have been controlled for. Sec-
ond, diﬀerences among states are exaggerated by diﬀerences in their indus-
trial compositions. The coeﬃcient of variation of the unadjusted index is
0.65, while the coeﬃcient of variation of the industry-adjusted index is
0.37. Third, once industrial composition has been accounted for, states
148 Arik Levinsonappear to be converging in their environmental standard stringency.
Fourth, when compared to conventional indexes of state environmental
regulations, these cost-based indexes have opposite implications for the
relative stringency of states. The two types of indexes are negatively cor-
related across states. Finally, when used in an analysis of the eﬀect of reg-
ulatory stringency on economic activity (FDI in this case), time-series
analyses using the industry-adjusted index have more sensible results than
cross-sectional analyses or analyses using the unadjusted index. Together,
these results imply that using conventional indexes or unadjusted cost in-
dexes to analyze state environmental policies can lead to misleading con-
clusions about the eﬀects of those policies on economic activity.
Appendix
Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) Data
PACE data come from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census. The data are published in Current Industrial Reports: Pollution
Abatement Costs and Expenditures, MA-200, 1974–94. The variable of
interest from this source was the pollution abatement gross annual cost
(GAC) total across all media types. Starting in 1977, the Census Bureau
collected data only for establishments with 20 or more employees. Al-
though PACE data were collected from all establishments for the years
1973–79, in order to lessen the administrative burden on small businesses,
they were dropped from the survey starting in 1980. The PACE Survey
was not collected in 1987. There are some censored observations for the
state totals, and in those cases values were interpolated.
Gross State Product Data
All GSP data were acquired via the Regional Economic Information
System CD, 1969–94, published by the U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Measurement Di-
vision.
League of Conservation Voters (LCV) Index
This index is the unweighted average of the House and Senate environ-
mental voting records. Each record is the average voting record for each
member of the state’s delegation. Thus, for states with more House mem-
bers than Senate members, the Senate votes are weighted more heavily
(and vice versa). The bills that are used to construct the index have been
chosen by the LCV. See http://www.lcv.org. For the Senate votes, the years
1977–78, 1979–80, 1983–84, 1985–86, and 1987–88 each had only one
Industry-Adjusted Index of State Environmental Compliance Costs 149scorecard. Therefore, the voting records for these years were entered sepa-
rately for each year. For the House votes, the years 1987–88 had only one
scorecard. Here also the same value was entered for both years. Also, the
House had a scorecard for 1985 and for 1985–86. The information from
the 1985 scorecard was used to disaggregate the 1985–86 scorecard by a
weighted average.
Property, Plant, and Equipment Investment
by Foreign-Owned Manufacturers
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Department of Commerce, For-
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The new analysis carried out in this paper on the eﬀects of environmental
compliance costs on economic activity stems from the unsatisfactory per-
formance of the existing indexes of environmental eﬀort in U.S. states. The
author calculates a new industry-adjusted index of U.S. states’ environ-
mental regulatory eﬀorts, taking into account environmental compliance
costs and the diﬀerences in industrial composition across states and within
states over time. This approach diﬀers from subjective indexes, which are
based on perceptions of the states’ eﬀorts at one time, and conventional
cost-based measures, which do not control for industrial composition.
There are three key motivations for creating this index. First, there is
poor enforcement of environmental federal standards in many U.S. states.
An industry-adjusted index is thus needed to analyze the variation of envi-
ronmental compliance costs across states. Second, the decentralization of
the responsibility for monitoring and enforcing environmental regulation
from the federal government to local regulators may cause the states’ strin-
gency to converge over time. Thus, an index is required to obtain data on
the level of such stringency. Third, it is diﬃcult to assess the eﬀects of en-
vironmental regulation on economic activity because existing indexes do
not take into account industrial composition and this reduces the link be-
tween compliance costs and environmental regulation.
Levinson’sindexprovidesnewdataonhistoricaltrendsinU.S.states’reg-
ulatory diﬀerences. It diﬀers from conventional wisdom regarding states’
relative environmental eﬀorts and provides a useful tool for research-
ers and policymakers exploring and testing the eﬀects of compliance costs
on economic activity.
The most striking ﬁnding is that when states’ regulatory stringency is
ranked according to the industry-adjusted index, results are quite diﬀerent
from the ranking according to cost-based unadjusted indexes. Moreover,
the dynamic evolution of the index shows that only few states’ rankings
change over time. It is, however, worth noticing that some results, espe-
cially for small U.S. states, might be heavily aﬀected by noisiness in the
data. Nevertheless, there is an evident downward trend in the variability
of regulatory stringency among states, although their industrial com-
position has become much more dissimilar.
This paper provides a new and important tool for both regulators and
policymakers because it allows us to conduct meaningful analyses of
states’ environmental eﬀorts, taking into account variations among states’
industrial composition. When policymakers set compliance standards they
need a complete picture of environmental regulation stringency and en-
Domenico Siniscalco is professor of economics at the University of Torino and director of
the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan.
156 Arik Levinsonforcement over time, compared with other U.S. states, to guarantee high
environmental standards and to avoid restriction of local ﬁrms’ competi-
tiveness. An eﬀective comparison of the environmental eﬀort across states
implies the deﬁnition of adjusted indexes that discriminate according to
the characteristics of each state area. An index that is not industry ad-
justed can lead to misleading conclusions about the actual eﬀects of envi-
ronmental regulation on economic activities; that is, highly polluting in-
dustries have higher compliance costs regardless of regulation strictness
and enforcement. Even if Levinson’s index is still not a measure of regula-
tory stringency alone, when it is used together with other state-speciﬁc
information, such as age of manufacturers, average dimension of ﬁrms,
and average wages, it allows us to answer several often-raised questions
about environmental law and enforcement.
The information provided by the index may also help ﬁrms in deciding
the location of new sites and the extent of investment in existing sites.
Considering the whole set of ﬁndings and the interesting implication
for regulators and ﬁrms’ decision making, this paper certainly indicates a
promising research area.
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